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The Questionable Grounds of Objections to 
Proselytism and Certain Other Forms of Religious 
Expression 
Paul M. Taylor 1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Proselytism seems to attract singular antagonism in many parts of 
the world. In some countries, the concern is for the maintenance of 
traditional state religion, especially where the influx of new religious 
movements that proselytize is seen to threaten the process of 
rebuilding or reigniting national identity.2 In some countries, 
national law is inseparable from religious law, and preservation of the 
orthodoxy of state religion is paramount. In other countries, for 
example Communist countries, proselytism conflicts with an 
ideology that does not easily accommodate the assertion of rights of 
the individual over the interests of the State. 
The clearest objections to proselytism have been expressed in the 
link between extreme forms of proselytism and coercion to change 
religion. These objections were voiced in the drafting of Article 18 of 
the Universal Declaration on Human Rights3 (“Universal 
Declaration”) and Article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights4 (“International Covenant”), although not 
 
 1. The author is a barrister (England and Wales). 
 2. Until recently, the protection of state religion has more commonly been a feature of 
many Islamic countries. However, in numerous countries of the former Soviet Bloc, measures 
to prevent the emergence of new religious movements, which filled the vacuum left by the 
abrupt exodus of Communism, include prohibitive registration formalities required for their 
establishment, as well as widespread prohibitions on religious practice, particularly proselytism. 
 3. Universal Declaration on Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), at 74, U.N. Doc. 
A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948) [hereinafter Universal Declaration]. Article 18 of the Universal 
Declaration reads as follows: “Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone 
or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in 
teaching, practice, worship and observance.”  
 4. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), at 55, 
U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966) [hereinafter International Covenant]. Article 18 of the 
International Covenant reads as follows: 
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extensively in the preparation of the Declaration on the Elimination 
of all Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion 
or Belief (“the 1981 Declaration”).5 The issue received little 
attention in the development of the equivalent provision in Article 9 
of the European Convention,6 since Article 9 simply drew its text 
from Article 18 of the Universal Declaration in pursuance of the 
express aim of the European Convention in taking “the first steps for 
collective enforcement of certain of the Rights stated in the 
Universal Declaration.”7 Article 9 was to be based as much as 
possible on Article 18 of the Universal Declaration to reduce the risk 
of devising definitions that were at odds with those in U.N. 
instruments. Nevertheless, objections to coercive forms of 
 
1. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. 
This right shall include freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice, 
and freedom, either individually or in community with others and in public or 
private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and 
teaching. 
2. No one shall be subject to coercion which would impair his freedom to have or to 
adopt a religion or belief of his choice. 
3. Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs may be subject only to such 
limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, order, 
health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others. 
4. The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to have respect for the 
liberty of parents and, when applicable, legal guardians to ensure the religious and 
moral education of their children in conformity with their own convictions. 
Id. 
 5. Universal Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and 
Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, G.A. Res. 36/55, U.N. Doc. A/RES/36/55 
(Nov. 25, 1981) [hereinafter 1981 Declaration]. 
 6. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, opened for signature Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter European 
Convention]. Article 9 of the European Convention reads as follows: 
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right 
includes freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in 
community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in 
worship, teaching, practice and observance. 
2. Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such 
limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the 
interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for 
the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. 
Id. 
 7. Id. at pmbl. For discussion of the drafting of the European Convention, see 
MARTINUS NIJHOFF, COUNCIL OF EUR., COLLECTED EDITION OF THE “TRAVAUX 
PREPARATOIRES” OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (1975–85). For 
commentary, see A.H. ROBERTSON & J.G. MERRILLS, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE WORLD 
(1996). 
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proselytism also have been aired in the European Court’s analysis of 
Article 9 in the concept of “improper” proselytism first developed in 
Kokkinakis v. Greece.8  
However, the basis of objections to non-coercive forms of 
proselytism and religious expression are less clear; but recent 
decisions of the European Court in such cases as Otto-Preminger-
Institut v. Austria9 and Murphy v Ireland10 suggest that principles of 
“respect” may enlarge the scope of the limitation provisions to justify 
restrictions even on non-coercive forms of proselytism.  
Although the notion of “respect” has developed primarily within 
the context of freedom of expression under Article 10, its application 
within the limitation grounds of Article 9 would represent a 
development which could restrict many forms of religious 
expression, including proselytism. In its response to Article 9 claims, 
the European Court has liberally supported the legitimacy of the 
aims claimed by States for restrictions on proselytism on the ground 
of protection for “the rights or freedoms of others,” generally 
preferring instead to make a substantive finding on the basis of 
whether the State measure was “necessary in a democratic society.”11 
If principles of “respect,” developed in the context of freedom of 
expression, are imported wholesale into the freedom of religion, the 
potential result would be an extremely broad interpretation of the 
limitation ground, “the rights and freedoms of others,” in such a 
way as to suggest a fundamental departure from universal standards. 
At the same time, it is necessary to recognize that both the Human 
Rights Committee and Special Rapporteur have endorsed 
proselytism as a proper manifestation of religion. The European 
Court has also given nominal endorsement to proselytism as a 
legitimate form of manifestation of religion or belief. 
Part II of this Article begins by addressing the objections raised 
against proselytism during the drafting of those U.N. instruments in 
which the freedom of thought, conscience, and religion is enshrined. 
These objections are most visible in the early debates and contrast 
with the support shown by both the Human Rights Committee and 
Special Rapporteur12 for proselytism as a legitimate manifestation of 
 
 8. 260 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1993). 
 9. 295 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1994). 
 10. App. No. 44179/98, 38 Eur. H.R. Rep. 212 (2003) (Commission report). 
 11. European Convention, supra note 6. 
 12. The Special Rapporteur is appointed by the Commission on Human Rights to 
TAYLOR MRO.DOC 9/12/2006 8:36:47 AM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2006 
814 
religion, coupled with condemnation of restrictions on proselytism 
and other forms of religious expression. Part II concludes with an 
assessment of the objections raised in those debates against 
proselytism in the light of prevailing U.N. standards. Part III of this 
article then evaluates the extent to which the notion of “respect” 
operates as a curb on proselytism, as invoked in the context of hate 
speech and the limitation provisions applicable to freedom of 
expression and freedom of religion. Part III plots the development of 
principles of “respect” in the case law of the European Court and 
concludes that this development has limited parallel in the practice of 
the Human Rights Committee. The notion of respect for the 
religious feelings of others is not itself a right found within the 
freedom of thought, conscience, and religion, and inappropriate 
appeals to “respect” could unduly extend the scope of limitation 
provisions. Part IV suggests various conclusions to be drawn from 
this discussion.  
II. BACKGROUND: U.N. STANDARDS AFFECTING PROSELYTISM 
The drafting history of Article 18 of the Universal Declaration 
and Article 18 of the International Covenant is important to 
understand—particularly the freedom from coercion as expressed in 
Article 18(2) of the Covenant.13 Karl Partsch has suggested that the 
purpose of inclusion of the words “the freedom to have or to adopt a 
religion or belief of his choice,” in Article 18(2) of the International 
Covenant, was to protect against zealous proselytizers and 
 
examine incidents and governmental action inconsistent with the 1981 Declaration. See supra 
note 5. The title of the “Special Rapporteur on religious intolerance” was changed to “Special 
Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief” by the Commission on Human Rights. U.N. 
Econ. & Soc. Council [U.N. ESCOR], Comm’n on H.R., Report to the Economic and Social 
Council on the Fifty-Sixth Session of the Commission, ¶ 11, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2000/L.11/ 
Add.4 (Apr. 20, 2000). 
 13. For commentary on the drafting of Article 18 of the Universal Declaration, supra 
note 3, see N. ROBINSON, UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: ITS ORIGINS, 
SIGNIFICANCE, APPLICATION AND INTERPRETATION (1958); Martin Scheinin, Article 18, in 
THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: A COMMON STANDARD OF 
ACHIEVEMENT (Gudmundur Alfredson & Asbjorn Eide eds., 1999). For commentary on the 
drafting of Article 18 of the International Covenant, see THEO VAN BOVEN, DE 
VOLKENRECHTELIJKE BESCHERMING VAN DE GODSDIENSTVRIJHEID (1967); Karl J. Partsch, 
Freedom of Conscience and Expression, and Political Freedoms, in THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF 
RIGHTS: THE COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 209–45 (Louis Henkin ed., 
1981). 
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missionaries.14 This was certainly a reason proposed for the adoption 
of Article 18(2), to support the right to maintain a religion. The 
focus of the original proposal was unequivocally the right to 
maintain a religion, so that legitimate steps might be taken to 
dissuade a change of religion.15 In the end, the Article 18(2) 
proposal was accepted, with appropriate clarification, to ensure that 
it merely made explicit something that was already implicit in the 
original text and was not more restrictive.16 Some thought it might 
otherwise be interpreted so as to jeopardize freedom of teaching, 
worship, practice and observance, or, more importantly, as limiting a 
person who sought to maintain or change their religion or belief.17 
The Australian delegate wanted it clearly understood “that the 
expression ‘coercion’ would not include persuasion or appeals to 
conscience.”18 Similarly, the Lebanese delegate would only support 
the proposal if it confirmed the right of others to preach and seek to 
influence a person either to maintain or to change his religion,19 as 
would the United Kingdom delegate, provided that it could not be 
interpreted as imposing limitations or restrictions on argument and 
discussion. From the use of the word “coercion,” that possibility, in 
any event, seemed to be excluded.20 It is evident then that appeals to 
conscience, preaching, and seeking to influence a person either to 
maintain or to change his religion were not to be regarded as 
coercive. 
The most direct statement on the interpretation of Article 18(2) 
was by the Human Rights Committee in paragraph 5 of General 
 
 14. Partsch, supra note 13, at 211. The text of Article 9 of the European Convention 
does not include a provision equivalent to Article 18(2) of the International Covenant. Id. 
This is because Article 9 was drawn from Article 18 of the Universal Declaration and was not 
shaped by the same concerns that initially led to proposals for Article 18(2) of the International 
Covenant. Id. 
 15. Article 18(2) stems from a two part amendment proposed by Egypt during the 
Commission’s eighth session in 1952. For the draft under discussion, see U.N. ESCOR, 
Comm’n on H.R., Annex I, U.N. Doc. E/1992 (1951). The amendment is at U.N. ESCOR, 
Comm’n on H.R., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/L.187. 
 16. U.N. ESCOR, Comm’n on H.R., 8th Sess., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SR.319 (1952). 
For the comments of the delegates of the Commission of the Churches on International 
Affairs, Lebanon, U.S.S.R., the United Kingdom, and Greece, see id. at 5, 8–9, 11 
respectively. 
 17. Id. at 6 (Commission of the Churches on International Affairs). 
 18. Id. at 7 (Australia). 
 19. Id. at 8 (Lebanon). 
 20. Id. at 9 (United Kingdom). 
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Comment No. 22, which adopts a very one-sided emphasis on State-
sponsored coercion, or coercion by those emulating State 
functions.21 It describes coercion for the purposes of Article 18(2) in 
terms of fairly extreme measures, such as “the use or threat of 
physical force or penal sanctions to compel believers or non-believers 
to adhere to their religious beliefs, to recant their religion or belief or 
to convert.”22 These illustrations do not resemble most imaginable 
forms of proselytism. Paragraph 5 then goes on to embrace, as 
coercive, “policies and practices having the same intention or 
effect.”23 The examples are interesting because they refer to the 
denial of facilities generally within the public realm, such as 
education, medical care, and employment, and rights which are to be 
safeguarded by the State, noting in particular Article 25 with its 
focus on participation in democratic and public life. Paragraph 5 
therefore suggests that the Human Rights Committee was primarily 
concerned about coercion imposed by or on behalf of the State by 
such means as denying facilities of a public nature, rather than private 
proselytism or missionary activity. 
The issue has also been raised in the Krishnaswami study24 (and 
the resulting 16 Rules) commissioned by the Sub-Commission on 
 
 21. U.N. ESCOR, Comm’n on H.R., General Comment Adopted by the Human Rights 
Committee Under Article 40, Paragraph 4, of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, cmt. 22(48), ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/REV.1/ADD.4 (Sept. 27, 1993) 
[hereinafter General Comment No. 22]. The text of General Comment No. 22 is at Annex 5. 
General Comments “represent the Human Rights Committee’s accumulated experience of 
years of consideration of a particular article . . . . [T]hey have the potential to be profoundly 
influential . . . [and] . . . perform a key function of giving some substantive content to the 
articles concerned.” U.N. ESCOR, Comm’n on H.R., Paper: Work of the Human Rights 
Committee Under Article 40 of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.157/TBB/2 (June 9, 1993). 
 22. General Comment No. 22, supra note 21, ¶ 5. 
 23. Id. 
 24. U.N. ESCOR, Comm’n on H.R., Study of Discrimination in the Matter of Religious 
Rights and Practices [hereinafter Study], U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/200/Rev.1 (1960) 
(prepared by Arcot Krishnaswami), reprinted in Arcot Krishnaswami, Study, 11 N.Y.U. J. INT’L 
L. & POL. 227 (1978). At the time of this study, Krishnaswami was the Special Rapporteur for 
the Commission on Human Rights. For further reading, see Sidney Liskofsky, The UN 
Declaration on the Elimination of Religious Intolerance and Discrimination: Historical and 
Legal Perspectives, in RELIGION AND THE STATE: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF LEO PFEFFER 440 
(James E. Wood ed., 1985); Donna J. Sullivan, Advancing the Freedom of Religion or Belief 
Through the UN Declaration of the Elimination of Religious Intolerance and Discrimination, 82 
AM. J. INT’L L. 487 (1988); J.A. Walkate, The U.N. Declaration on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Intolerance and Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief (1981) – An Historical 
Overview, 1(2) CONSCIENCE & LIBERTY 21 (1989). 
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Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, and by 
the Sub-Commission when developing Draft Principles25 on the basis 
of the study. Krishnaswami’s Rule I(3) reads: “No one should be 
subjected to coercion or to improper inducements likely to impair 
his freedom to maintain or to change his religion or belief.”26 The 
Sub-Commission’s Principle I(3) refers to “material and moral 
coercion.”27 At the same time, the Sub-Commission emphasized 
that, in the event of conflicting religious interests, “public authorities 
shall endeavor to find a solution reconciling these demands in a 
manner such as to ensure the greatest measure of freedom to society 
as a whole.”28 It is likely that Principle I(3) was not intended to 
embrace proselytism and missionary activity, particularly given that 
Principle I(1) refers to the freedom “to adhere, or not to adhere, to 
a religion or belief, in accordance with the dictates of his 
conscience,”29 and that Principle II(8)(a) asserts that “[e]veryone 
shall be free to teach or to disseminate his religion or belief, either in 
public or in private.”30 The Principle omits the qualification found in 
Krishnaswami’s Rule 10 that only acknowledged the individual’s 
freedom to disseminate “in so far as his actions do not impair the 
right of any other individual to maintain his religion or belief.”31 If 
anything, the Sub-Commission’s Draft Principles avoid the 
connection between the simple dissemination of beliefs and coercion 
in matters of religion or belief. 
 
 25. U.N. ESCOR, Sub-Comm. on Prevention of Discrimination & Prot. of Minorities, 
Draft Principles on Freedom and Non-Discrimination in the Matter of Religious Rights and 
Practices, ¶ 51–160, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/800, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/206, Annex 
(1960) [hereinafter Draft Principles]. The text of the Draft Principles may be found in 
Krishnaswami, supra note 24, Annex 1. 
 26. Krishnaswami, supra note 24, at 227. 
 27. Draft Principles, supra note 25, at Principle I(3). This shaped the proposals for what 
ultimately became Article 1(2) of the 1981 Declaration. See supra note 5. The representative of 
Cyprus proposed that this provision read: “The use of physical or moral compulsion for the 
purpose of making a person change or preventing him from changing his religion is 
prohibited.” U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1347, ¶ 18 (1979). In order to distinguish coercion from 
persuasion and in order to promote religious tolerance, the Indonesian delegate proposed that 
Article 1(2) read: “No one shall be subject to coercion or any kind of persuasion which would 
impair his freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice. Therefore, any act 
which leads to such practices is inadmissible.” U.N. Doc. A/C.3/36/SR.34, ¶ 32 (1981). 
 28. Draft Principles, supra note 25, Principle IV(1). 
 29. Id. Principle I(1). 
 30. Id. Principle II(8)(a). 
 31. Krishnaswami, supra note 24, at 279. 
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It has been a matter of concern to the Special Rapporteur 
whenever restrictions have been placed on any form of proselytism, 
preaching, or the propagation of belief, as communicated to many 
countries.32 In an assessment of communications between 1988 and 
 
 32. Some of the countries to which the Special Rapporteur has communicated his 
concern over restrictions on proselytism include: China, U.N. ESCOR, Comm’n on Human 
Rights, Implementation of the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of 
Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief [hereinafter Implementation], ¶ 41, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/1994/79 (Jan. 20, 1994); Malaysia, U.N. ESCOR, Comm’n on Human Rights, 
Implementation, ¶ 44, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1993/62 (Jan. 6, 1993); U.N. ESCOR, Comm’n 
on Human Rights, Implementation, ¶ 59, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1990/46 (Jan. 22, 1990); 
Egypt, U.N. ESCOR, Comm’n on Human Rights, Implementation, ¶ 57, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/1991/56 (Jan. 18, 1991); Nepal, U.N. ESCOR, Comm’n on Human Rights, 
Implementation, ¶ 53, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1989/44 (1989); U.N. ESCOR, Comm’n on 
Human Rights, Implementation, ¶ 63, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1990/46 (Jan. 22, 1990); U.N. 
ESCOR, Comm’n on Human Rights, Implementation, ¶ 79, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1991/56 
(Jan. 18, 1991); Elimination of all Forms of Religious Intolerance, G.A. Res. 56/253, ¶ 54, 
U.N. Doc. A/56/253 (July 31, 2001); Malawi, U.N. ESCOR, Comm’n on Human Rights, 
Implementation, ¶ 43, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1993/62 (Jan. 6, 1993); Bulgaria, U.N. ESCOR, 
Comm’n on Human Rights, Implementation, ¶ 22, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2001/63 (Feb. 13, 
2001); Russian Federation, U.N. ESCOR, Comm’n on Human Rights, Implementation, ¶ 56, 
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1999/58 (Jan. 11, 1999); U.N. ESCOR, Comm’n on Human Rights, 
Implementation, ¶ 35, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2000/65 (Feb. 15, 2000); Maldives, U.N. 
ESCOR, Comm’n on Human Rights, Implementation, ¶ 73, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1999/58 
(Jan. 11, 1999); Uzbekistan, U.N. ESCOR, Comm’n on Human Rights, Implementation, ¶ 
83, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1999/58 (Jan. 11, 1999); U.N. ESCOR, Comm’n on Human 
Rights, Implementation, ¶ 334, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2005/61/Add.1 (Mar. 15, 2005); Saudi 
Arabia, U.N. ESCOR, Comm’n on Human Rights, Implementation, ¶ 10, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/2000/65 (Feb. 15, 2000); Israel, U.N. ESCOR, Comm’n on Human Rights, 
Implementation, ¶ 56, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2000/65 (Feb. 15, 2000); Lao People’s 
Democratic Republic, U.N. ESCOR, Comm’n on Human Rights, Implementation, ¶ 88, 
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2000/65 (Feb. 15, 2000); Sudan, Implementation, G.A. Res. 51/542, ¶ 
73, U.N. Doc. A/51/542/Add.2 (Nov. 11, 1996); Myanmar, U.N. ESCOR, Comm’n on 
Human Rights, Implementation, ¶ 55, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2003/66 (Jan. 15, 2003); 
Azerbaijan, Elimination of all Forms of Religious Intolerance, G.A. Res. 57/274, ¶ 14, U.N. 
Doc. A/57/274 (July 15, 2002); United Arab Emirates, U.N. ESCOR, Comm’n on Human 
Rights, Implementation, ¶ 45, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2004/63 (Jan. 16, 2004); India, U.N. 
ESCOR, Comm’n on Human Rights, Implementation, ¶ 58, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/1997/91/Add.1 (Feb. 14, 1997). 
 As a result of the Special Rapporteur’s visit to Iran, he endorsed the recommendations of 
Mr. Abid Hussain, the Special Rapporteur on freedom of opinion and expression, who 
considered that: “Any prior restraint on freedom of expression carries with it a heavy 
presumption of invalidity under international human rights law. Any institutionalization of 
such restraint adds further weight to this presumption.” In his opinion, the protection of the 
right of freedom of opinion and expression, and the right to seek, receive, and impart 
information, would be better served not by routinely submitting specific types of expression to 
prior scrutiny, as is currently the case, but rather by initiating action after publication, if and 
when required. U.N. ESCOR, Comm’n on Human Rights, Implementation, ¶ 96, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/1996/95/Add.2 (Feb. 9, 1996) (quoting U.N. ESCOR, Comm’n on Human 
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1995, the Special Rapporteur observed that Article 1 of the 
1981 Declaration “accounts for the second highest number of 
violations[,] . . . mainly cases of prohibition of proselytizing, of 
possessing certain religious objects and cases of forced 
conversions.”33 
The Special Rapporteur has also criticized restrictions on the 
work of foreign missionaries in a variety of countries and appears to 
be more concerned about restrictions on missionary work than its 
supposed coercive effect.34 In his study, when considering 
particularly vulnerable categories such as orphans or deprived school 
children, Krishnaswami was fully aware of the risk that material 
 
Rights, Implementation, ¶ 40, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1996/39/Add.1 (Nov. 21, 1995)); see 
also U.N. ESCOR, Comm’n on Human Rights, Implementation, ¶ 37, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/1993/62 (Jan. 6, 1993); U.N. ESCOR, Comm’n on Human Rights, 
Implementation, ¶ 51, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1995/91 (Dec. 22, 1994). 
 The Special Rapporteur has also addressed the restrictions on proselytism in Greece. U.N. 
ESCOR, Comm’n on Human Rights, Implementation, ¶ 43, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1990/46 
(Jan. 22, 1990); U.N. ESCOR, Comm’n on Human Rights, Implementation, ¶ 32, U.N. 
Doc. E/CN.4/1993/62 (Jan. 6, 1993). In the Special Rapporteur’s report on his visit to 
Greece he commented that “in practice the religious freedom of minorities is severely 
undermined, given the manner in which proselytism is viewed.” Implementation, G.A. Res. 
51/542, ¶¶ 12, 25, U.N. Doc. A/51/542/Add.1 (Nov. 7, 1996). In his conclusions and 
recommendations, removal of the legal prohibition against proselytism was very strongly 
recommended. Id. 
 33. U.N. ESCOR, Comm’n on H.R., Implementation, ¶ 27, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/1996/95 (Dec. 15, 1995). 
 34. For example, the Special Rapporteur commented that in Sudan, “many obstacles are 
said to be hampering the work of local priests and missionaries who are endeavouring to bring 
moral and spiritual comfort to the population near El Obeid and in the Nubian mountain 
area.” U.N. ESCOR, Comm’n on H.R., Implementation, ¶ 75, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/1994/79 (Jan. 20, 1994). Similar concerns were addressed by the Special 
Rapporteur to Bhutan concerning the ban on practicing Christianity. U.N. ESCOR, Comm’n 
on H.R., Implementation, ¶ 21, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1995/91 (Dec. 22, 1994). Likewise, in 
Nepal, the Government sought to justify the ban on “involuntary” conversion from Hinduism 
resulting from “financial enticement and other temptations.” U.N. ESCOR, Comm’n on 
H.R., Implementation, ¶ 66, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1994/79 (Jan. 20, 1994). Restrictions on 
the work of foreign missionaries were also noted by the Special Rapporteur in relation to 
Bangladesh, U.N. ESCOR, Comm’n on H.R., Implementation, ¶ 15, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/2000/65 (Feb. 15, 2000), Belarus, id. ¶ 16, India, id. ¶ 46, and Niger, U.N. 
ESCOR, Comm’n on H.R., Implementation, ¶ 107, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2001/63 (Feb. 13, 
2001). However, he also referred to the possibility “that minorities themselves may 
occasionally be sources” of the intolerance towards other religious communities. Id. ¶¶ 131, 
184. For other restrictions on proselytism recently noted by the Special Rapporteur (in spite of 
assertions that improper inducements were offered), see U.N. ESCOR, Comm’n on H.R., 
Implementation, ¶ 94, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2004/63 (Jan. 16, 2004), referring to Sri Lanka, 
and U.N. ESCOR, Comm’n on H.R., Implementation, ¶ 77, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/2003/66/Add.1 (Jan. 9, 2003), referring to Algeria. 
TAYLOR MRO.DOC 9/12/2006 8:36:47 AM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2006 
820 
inducement might render missionary work open to the accusation of 
coercion, but applauded the work of missionaries, who have achieved 
remarkable results in many parts of the world where children would 
not otherwise have been educated. He did not rule out the 
possibility of isolated cases of improper inducements amounting even 
to outright bribes. However, in the wider realm of missionary 
hospitals, schools, and orphanages, he concluded that 
where the prior right of parents or guardians to decide whether or 
not their children shall attend religious instruction is conceded, and 
where the institutions in question advance social welfare, the 
advantages obtained by such educational and humanitarian 
activities can hardly be considered to constitute a material 
inducement to a change of religion or belief.35 
The notion of improper “inducement” is elusive and casts largely 
unsubstantiated doubt over missionary and humanitarian work. 
In short, although there were proposals in the drafting of 
Article 18(2) for a basis to oppose influences to change religion, and 
for an explicit right to maintain a religion, the characterization of 
proselytism and missionary work as coercive was not sustained. 
Instead, it may be said that the focus of the Article is predominantly 
on State coercion in religious choice rather than private acts of 
proselytism. This is supported by paragraph 5 of General Comment 
No. 22, which makes no reference at all to such activities.36 Although 
Article 18(2) is a general measure to prevent any coercion that 
would interfere with the individual’s religious choice, there is strong 
endorsement for proselytism as a proper manifestation of religion 
and consistent criticism for restrictions on proselytism. 
III. “RESPECT” AS A RESTRICTION ON PROSELYTISM 
Of course, the right to manifest religion or belief is subject to 
specific limitation provisions. “The rights and freedoms of others” 
(or equivalent terminology) appears as a ground of limitation in 
Articles 8, 9, 10, and 11 (and in Article 2 of the Fourth Protocol) of 
the European Convention,37 and in Articles 18, 19, 21, and 22 of 
the International Covenant.38 In each case, the limitation provision 
 
 35. Krishnaswami, supra note 24. 
 36. General Comment No. 22, supra note 21. 
 37. European Convention, supra note 6. 
 38. International Covenant, supra note 4. 
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operates, where appropriate, to justify State restriction of the exercise 
of the freedoms guaranteed in those Articles. However, appropriate 
limits to the “rights of others” must be observed. This Part argues 
that, in a review of those cases which have invoked general notions 
of respect for the religious feelings of others within this ground of 
limitation, such respect is not itself a right found within the freedom 
of thought, conscience, and religion, and that inappropriate appeals 
to “respect” could unduly extend the scope of limitation provisions. 
Consistency with the traditionally recognized content of the 
freedom of thought, conscience, and religion may easily be achieved 
by an interpretation of “respect” that is confined to ensuring that the 
effect of the manifestation of religion or belief, or the exercise of 
freedom of expression, does not impinge on the known content of 
that freedom (or indeed other freedoms). This is quite different from 
a right to “respect for one’s religious feelings” as such. Such a right 
might instead be said to stem more generally from the “duties and 
responsibilities” to which the freedom of expression is subject. 
Neither the International Covenant nor the European Convention 
includes an explicit right to have one’s beliefs respected or a right 
not to be offended by the expression of religious beliefs by others. 
However, given recent developments, European Court decisions 
regarding the notion of “respect” deserve close analysis, particularly 
in the context of hate speech and severe blasphemous expression. 
A. Hate Speech Constraints 
There has been some, though limited, use of the term “respect” 
to support restrictions on hate speech.39 Article 20 of the 
 
 39. Certain distinctions are important to make. In the context of the drafting of the 
Convention on religious intolerance, the point was rightly made that criticism of one religion 
by the adherents of another religion was not necessarily an incitement to hatred and that a 
distinction had to be made between propagating one religion and fostering or inciting hatred 
against another. Implementation, ¶ 61, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/940 (1967). A different 
distinction was made in the drafting of the 1981 Declaration when Egypt opposed the 
U.S.S.R. proposal which contemplated a right to criticize religious beliefs on the basis that this 
gave rise to intolerance. Implementation, ¶ 39, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1292; E/1978/34 
(1978). For a summary of measures to combat racist and hate speech, see Danilo Türk & 
Louis Joinet, The Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression: Current Problems of its 
Realization and Measures Necessary for its Strengthening and Promotion, in STRIKING A 
BALANCE: HATE SPEECH, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND NON-DISCRIMINATION (Sandra 
Coliver ed., 1992). See also KENT GREENAWALT, SPEECH, CRIMES AND THE USES OF 
LANGUAGE (1989); A. Garay, Liberté religieuse et proselytisme: l’experience Européene, 17 
REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DES DROITS DE L’HOMME 144 (1994); R. Genn, Legal 
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International Covenant imposes a restriction on all activities 
amounting to the “advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred 
that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence.”40 
In debating paragraph 7 of General Comment 22,41 which deals with 
the interrelation between manifestation of religion and hate speech, 
the issue of “respect” for the beliefs and religions of others was aired 
briefly. It was quickly realized that Article 20 imposes a restriction 
not rooted in “respect” for the beliefs and religion of others, but on 
the freedom to manifest religion or belief; in that the prohibition on 
hate speech might operate as a brake on manifestation.42 Having 
raised the issue of respect by individuals for the beliefs and religions 
of others, the Human Rights Committee defined the limits of such 
respect by reference to the scope of Article 20.43 
One source of material in which the notion of “respect” has 
played a part concerns the restriction in a number of countries on the 
promotion of revisionist ideas. These have resulted in claims under 
the European Convention and the Optional Protocol.44 The Human 
Rights Committee has generally upheld the protection of the 
reputation of others as an appropriate ground of limitation on 
freedom of expression. For example, in X. v. Federal Republic of 
Germany,45 since the murder of the Jews was a “known historic 
fact,” the applicant was prevented from asserting that the Holocaust 
was a piece of Zionist swindle. The European Commission found 
that the restriction was justified by the protection of the reputation 
 
Developments—Helsinki Process—Advance in International Outlawing of Incitement to Racism 
and Religious Hatred, 24 PAT. OF PREJ. 97 (1990); P. Rumney, Incitement to Racial Hatred 
and the Problem of Social Exclusion, 5(2) C.I.L. 89 (2000–01); E. Steiner, Blasphemy and 
Incitement to Hatred Under the European Convention, 6 K.C.L.J. 143 (1995). 
 40. International Covenant, supra note 4, at art. 20. Article 20(2) of the International 
Covenant reads: “Any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes 
incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law.” Id. 
 41. General Comment No. 22, supra note 21, ¶ 7. 
 42. See ¶ 23, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/SR. 1207 (1993) ¶ 23 (Mrs. Higgins); ¶ 23 (Mr. 
Herndl), ¶ 30 (Mr. Pocar); ¶ 33 (Ms. Chanet). 
 43. For discussion on the interrelation between Articles 18–20 of the International 
Covenant, supra note 4, see Brice Dickson, The United Nations and Freedom of Religion, 44 
INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 327, 340 (1995). 
 44. See Jonathan Cooper & Adrian M. Williams, Hate Speech, Holocaust Denial and 
International Human Rights Law, 6 EUR. H.R. L. REV. 593 (1996). 
 45. X. v. Federal Republic of Germany, App. No. 9235/81, 29 Eur. Comm’n H.R. 
Dec. & Rep. 194 (1982). 
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of others within Article 10 of the European Convention,46 although 
it is to be observed that this ground of limitation is specific to 
Article 10 and has no equivalent in Article 9. A similar conclusion 
was reached in the Optional Protocol case of Faurisson v. France47 
involving the denial of the Holocaust by a university professor. The 
Human Rights Committee likewise examined this in the framework 
of freedom of expression, and found that France could properly rely 
on the limitation provision in Article 19(3)(a) of the International 
Covenant.48 Referring to General Comment No. 10, the Committee 
noted that the protection of the rights or reputation of others as a 
limitation ground may relate not only to the interests of other 
persons, but also those of the community as a whole.49 The Human 
Rights Committee concluded that “[s]ince the statements made by 
the author, read in their full context, were of a nature as to raise or 
strengthen anti-Semitic feelings, the restriction served the respect of 
the Jewish community to live free from fear of an atmosphere of 
anti-Semitism.”50 The Human Rights Committee’s reference to 
“respect” in this context recognizes the right of a community to live 
free from hatred. In the more recent decision of Ross v. Canada,51 
the Human Rights Committee made no reference at all to “respect” 
in the case of an Article 19 claim concerning a schoolteacher’s 
statements which denigrated the faith and belief of Jews and called 
on others to hold those of the Jewish faith and ancestry in 
contempt.52 Restrictions against such speech were for the purpose of 
“protecting the ‘rights and reputations’ of persons of Jewish faith, 
 
 46. Id. at 198. It should be observed that this limitation is specific to Article 10 and has 
no equivalent in Article 9. European Convention, supra note 6. See also Marais v. France, App. 
No. 31159/96, 86 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 184 (1996); T. v. Belgium, App. No. 
9777/82, 34 D&R 158 (1983). For further discussion of the legal implications of revisionist 
speech, see Stephen Roth, Denial of the Holocaust as an Issue of Law, 23 ISR. Y.B.H.R. 215. 
 47. Faurisson v. France, Views of U.N. Human Rights Comm., Commc’n No. 
550/1993, 84, U.N. Doc. A/52/40 vol. 2 (Nov. 8, 1996). 
 48. Id. at 84–85. 
 49. Id. at 96. 
 50. Id. (emphasis added). 
 51. Ross v. Canada, Views of Human Rights Comm., Commc’n No. 736/1997, 69, 
U.N. Doc. A/56/40 vol. 2 (Oct. 18, 2000). See also Zündel v. Canada, Decision of Human 
Rights Comm., Commc’n No. 953/2000, 483, U.N. Doc. A/58/40 vol. 2 (July 27, 2003), 
which concerned a limited restriction on the hiring of the Parliament buildings by the author 
who had been active for many years in Holocaust denial (held inadmissible ratione materiae). 
 52. Ross, Views of Human Rights Comm., Commc’n No. 736/1997 at 70. 
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including the right to have an education in the public school system 
free from bias, prejudice and intolerance.”53 
From these cases involving hate speech—even those determined 
as a matter of freedom of expression—the term “respect” has been 
applied in a limited way to protect the reputation of others. 
However, various members of the Human Rights Committee have 
warned of the dangers of allowing limitation clauses to be invoked 
too readily in the case of offensive or unpopular speech which falls 
outside the prohibition against hate speech in Article 20 of the 
International Covenant. The concurring opinion of Human Rights 
Committee members Ms. Evatt and Mr. Kretzmer (co-signed by Mr. 
Klein) in Faurisson reflects these concerns: 
The power given to States parties under article 19, paragraph 3, to 
place restrictions on freedom of expression, must not be interpreted 
as licence to prohibit unpopular speech, or speech which some 
sections of the population find offensive. Much offensive speech 
may be regarded as speech that impinges on one of the values 
mentioned in article 19, paragraph 3 (a) or (b) (the rights or 
reputations of others, national security, public order, public health 
or morals). The Covenant therefore stipulates that the purpose of 
protecting one of those values is not, of itself, sufficient reason to 
restrict expression. The restriction must be necessary to protect the 
given value.54 
Mr. Lallah would have preferred the decision in Faurisson to 
have been made under the stricter framework of Article 20(2) rather 
than Article 19(3), since 
[r]ecourse to restrictions that are, in principle, permissible under 
article 19, paragraph 3, bristles with difficulties, tending to destroy 
the very existence of the right sought to be restricted. The right to 
freedom of opinion and expression is a most valuable right and may 
turn out to be too fragile for survival in the face of too frequently 
professed necessity for its restriction in the wide range of areas 
envisaged under paragraphs (a) and (b) of article 19, paragraph 3.55 
There would certainly appear to be support for choosing to 
determine restrictions on offensive speech within the scope of 
 
 53. Id. at 84. 
 54. Faurisson, Views of U.N. Human Rights Comm, Commc’n No. 550/1993 at 84. 
 55. Id. (Mr. Lallah, concurring). 
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Article 20(2)56 (or Article 5 of the International Covenant,57 or 
Article 17 of the European Convention58 in severe cases) when 
justified by the content of the speech. However, in considering 
limitations on freedom of expression in the interests of the 
protection of the “reputation” or “rights of others” outside the 
realms of hate speech, European jurisprudence appears to have 
departed from the practice of the Human Rights Committee by 
widening the concept of “the rights and freedoms of others” to 
suggest there may exist a right to have one’s religious beliefs 
“respected.” 
B. The Development of “Respect” in European Jurisprudence 
The most significant use of “respect” has occurred within 
European case law—in the context of freedom of expression, not 
freedom of religion—in response to instances of severe blasphemous 
expression by media dissemination. For example, in Otto-Preminger-
Institut v. Austria,59 the European Court supported a ban on 
distribution of a film representing an extreme form of ridicule of the 
Christian Eucharist. The European Court applied criteria found in 
Article 10 rather than Article 9, in particular the “duties and 
responsibilities” on those exercising their freedom of expression 
found in Article 10(2).60 It was in relation to such duties and 
responsibilities that it considered it appropriate to include “an 
obligation to avoid as far as possible expressions that are gratuitously 
offensive to others and thus an infringement of their rights, and 
which therefore do not contribute to any form of public debate 
capable of furthering progress in human affairs.”61 
1. Distinguishing between Articles 9 and 10 
The European Court’s judgment in Otto-Preminger is open to 
criticism for failing to distinguish issues under Articles 9 from those 
under Article 10.62 When examining whether the interference had a 
 
 56. International Covenant, supra note 4, art. 20(2). 
 57. Id. 
 58. European Convention, supra note 6, art. 17. 
 59. Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria, 295 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1994). 
 60. Id. ¶ 49. 
 61. Id. 
 62. European Convention, supra note 6. 
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legitimate aim, the Court referred to those “who choose to exercise 
the freedom to manifest their religion” when only Article 10 was at 
issue. The Court also mentioned “respect for the religious feelings of 
believers as guaranteed in Article 9” as if it was a recognized right 
within Article 9 and thereby constituted a ground of limitation 
under Article 10: 
Those who choose to exercise the freedom to manifest their 
religion, irrespective of whether they do so as members of a 
religious majority or a minority, cannot reasonably expect to be 
exempt from all criticism. They must tolerate and accept the denial 
by others of their religious beliefs and even the propagation by 
others of doctrines hostile to their faith. However, the manner in 
which religious beliefs and doctrines are opposed or denied is a 
matter which may engage the responsibility of the State, notably its 
responsibility to ensure the peaceful enjoyment of the rights 
guaranteed under Article 9 (art. 9) to the holders of those beliefs 
and doctrines. Indeed, in extreme cases the effect of particular 
methods of opposing or denying religious beliefs can be such as to 
inhibit those who hold them from exercising their freedom to hold 
and express them.63 
The distinction between Articles 9 and 10 was clarified in the 
case of Wingrove v. United Kingdom.64 The maker of a film entitled 
Visions of Ecstasy claimed that the refusal of a British Board of Film 
Classification certificate needed for the lawful video distribution of 
the film amounted to violation of Article 10 of the European 
Convention.65 Most of the film’s duration was given over to 
denigrating imagery of the figure of the crucified Christ.66 The Board 
refused classification because of its blasphemous content, measured 
by the United Kingdom’s concept of blasphemy.67 The European 
Court took as its starting point the purpose of the Board in 
protecting against the treatment of a religious subject in such a 
manner “as to be calculated (that is, bound, not intended) to 
outrage those who have an understanding of, sympathy towards and 
support for the Christian story and ethic, because of the 
 
 63. Otto-Preminger ¶ 47. 
 64. Wingrove v. United Kingdom, 24 Eur. H.R. Rep. (1996). 
 65. Id. ¶¶ 11–13. 
 66. Id. ¶ 9. 
 67. Id. ¶ 13. 
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contemptuous, reviling, insulting, scurrilous or ludicrous tone, style 
and spirit in which the subject is presented.”68 
In upholding this as a legitimate aim, the European Court 
accepted that it undoubtedly corresponded to that of the protection 
of “the rights of others” within the meaning of Article 10(2) and 
noted that this “is also fully consonant with the aim of the 
protections afforded by Article 9 to religious freedom.”69 In doing 
so, the Court deliberately avoided equating “respect for the religious 
feelings of believers” with the guarantees in Article 9, as it had in its 
decision in Otto-Preminger.70 It also avoided discussion on whether 
this constituted a ground of limitation for the purposes of 
Article 9(2). The European Court emphasized, as it had done in 
Otto-Preminger, that the duties and responsibilities in Article 10(2) 
in the context of religious beliefs include a duty to avoid as far as 
possible an expression that is, in regard to objects of veneration, 
“gratuitously offensive to others and profanatory.”71 The European 
Court then concluded that because the film amounted to an attack 
on the religious beliefs of Christians, which was insulting and 
offensive, the refusal of a classification certificate was within the 
State’s “margin of appreciation” under Article 10.72 In his 
concurring opinion, Judge Pettiti emphasized the importance of this 
approach and commented as follows: 
Article 9 (art. 9) is not in issue in the instant case and cannot be 
invoked. Certainly the Court rightly based its analysis under 
Article 10 (art. 10) on the rights of others and did not, as it had 
done in the Otto-Preminger-Institut judgment combine Articles 9 
and 10 (art. 9, art. 10), morals and the rights of others.73 
There does not appear to be room to conclude that Article 9 
includes a general right to be protected from offensive expression, 
although it is clear that the protection of Article 9 provides a basis 
for restriction where the effect of such an expression is to impair the 
enjoyment of Article 9 freedoms. Even though the judgment in 
Otto-Preminger did not distinguish Article 9 rights from Article 10 
 
 68. Id. ¶ 15. 
 69. Id. ¶ 48. 
 70. Id. ¶ 46. 
 71. Id. ¶ 52. 
 72. Id. ¶ 63. 
 73. Id. (Pettiti, J., concurring). 
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responsibilities, the Court still chose in that case to illustrate the 
need to ensure the peaceful enjoyment of Article 9 rights 
unequivocally by reference to conventionally accepted Article 9 
rights, namely the right to hold and express religious beliefs, which 
in extreme cases could be impaired.74 This is simply to acknowledge 
that there is a responsibility to ensure that the effect of the exercise of 
freedom of expression does not impinge on known Article 9 
freedoms, or indeed on other freedoms. This is quite different from a 
right to “respect for one’s religious feelings” as such. 
2. Distinction between proper and improper proselytism 
In Otto-Preminger, the Court explained that a State may 
legitimately consider it necessary to take measures aimed at 
repressing certain conduct judged to be “incompatible with the 
respect for the freedom of thought, conscience and religion of 
others,” citing as appropriate authority paragraph 48 from the case 
of Kokkinakis v. Greece.75 The European Court’s analysis in 
paragraph 48 of Kokkinakis of “the rights and freedoms of others” 
may be read in terms of coercion impairing free religious choice, 
amounting to interference with the forum internum.76 This reading 
of Kokkinakis is substantiated by the description of “improper 
proselytism” in paragraph 48, which describes it in terms of “offering 
material or social advantages,” “improper pressure on people in 
distress or in need,” and “violence or brainwashing,” all of which the 
Court stated are “incompatible with respect for the freedom of 
thought, conscience and religion of others.”77 
 
 74. Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria, 295 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1994). 
 75. Id. ¶ 47 (quoting Kokkinakis v. Greece, 260 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) ¶ 48 (1993)). 
Kokkinakis involved the conviction of a Jehovah’s Witnesses missionary for proselytizing under 
a Greek statute that prohibited proselytism. Kokkinakis, 260 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A). Paragraph 
48 of the Kokkinakis decision is also consistent with the Court’s references in Larissis v. Greece, 
65 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1998), to “improper pressure” applied to subordinate airmen and 
the equivalent “pressures and constraints” that were not applied to civilians. Id. The Court 
observed that airmen must not only have felt constrained, perhaps obliged to enter into 
religious discussions with the applicants, but also possibly ‘even to convert to the Pentacostal 
faith.” Id. ¶ 53. 
 76. The forum internum is taken to denote the internal and private realm against which 
no State interference is justified in any circumstances, while the forum externum, or right of 
manifestation, may be restricted by the State on specified grounds. 
 77. Kokkinakis, 260 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) ¶ 48. 
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These illustrations are reminiscent of the descriptions of coercion 
that would impair religious choice given in the U.N. context by 
Krishnaswami and by the Sub-Commission on Prevention of 
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities. Krishnaswami’s 
Rule 1(3) refers to “improper inducements”78 and the Sub-
Commission’s Draft Principle I(3) refers to “material or moral 
coercion.”79 Furthermore, in paragraph 33 of the Kokkinakis 
judgment, in which the Court first invoked the notion of “respect” 
in relation to proselytism, the Court was at pains to differentiate 
Article 9 from other Convention Articles (namely Articles 8, 10, and 
11) by virtue of the absolute nature of that part of the right to 
freedom of thought, conscience, and religion which may not be 
subject to limitation, i.e. the forum internum.80 By contrast, all rights 
covered by Articles 8, 10, and 11 are subject to limitation provisions. 
The right of the applicant in Kokkinakis to manifest his religion or 
belief in Article 9 must inevitably avoid encroaching upon those 
rights of others in Article 9 which are absolute. The Court 
recognized “that in democratic societies, in which several religions 
coexist within one and the same population, it may be necessary to 
place restrictions on this freedom in order to reconcile the interests 
of the various groups and ensure that everyone’s beliefs are 
respected.”81 
It may be said that the European Court in Kokkinakis was simply 
reiterating the need to respect forum internum rights by ensuring 
that they be protected against interference.82 It would be appropriate 
 
 78. Krishnaswami, supra note 24, at 278. 
 79. Draft Principles, supra note 25, at Principle I(3). 
 80. Kokkinakis, 260 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) ¶ 33. 
 81. Id. See also the partly concurring opinion of Judge Pettiti in Kokkinakis: 
[b]elievers and agnostic philosophers have a right to expound their beliefs, to try to 
get other people to share them and even to try to convert those whom they are 
addressing. 
  The only limits on the exercise of this right are those dictated by respect for 
the rights of others where there is an attempt to coerce the person into consenting 
or to use manipulative techniques. 
Id. (Pettiti, J., concurring). 
 82. Id. Judge Martens, partly dissenting in Kokkinakis, explained what he understood 
coercion to mean in this context: 
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to give “respect” that meaning—in the context of ensuring that 
chosen beliefs are “respected”—whenever there is a possibility that 
the right to free religious choice might be at risk of impairment by 
means of coercion. “Respect” in this sense would simply denote 
assurance against interference with the forum internum, but would 
extend equally to assurance against interference with the right to 
manifestation, as was suggested in Otto-Preminger. Few would 
contest that proselytism is aimed ultimately at presenting an 
alternative religious choice. Assuming there is no likelihood of 
interference with the right to manifestation by the person 
proselytized—and it is difficult to imagine how proselytism could 
have the effect of inhibiting manifestation by others—the decisive 
issue is whether proselytism is “improper” by virtue of being coercive 
in impairing the religious choice of others, and thereby constitutes 
“improper pressure,” to use the language of the Court.83 The 
Kokkinakis judgment may not be said to extend “the rights and 
freedoms of others” to include a right to have their beliefs 
“respected” in any sense beyond the accepted boundaries of the 
forum internum (it did not address possible effects on the ability of 
the subject to manifest their own beliefs) and the judgment did not 
suggest that Article 9 extends to a right to be free from persuasion 
by others that falls short of coercion impairing free religious choice, 
or even a right not have one’s own beliefs criticized. 
In short, the propagation of belief, even if hostile to other faiths, 
is protected within established parameters. First, it must not 
constitute hate speech. Secondly, in the case of freedom of 
expression through film and other powerful media, certain duties 
and responsibilities must be observed to avoid gratuitous and 
extreme offense. Finally, the recognized rights and freedoms of 
others must be “respected” in the sense that those freedoms must 
not be impaired. In the case of proselytism, Kokkinakis suggests that 
the relevant rights and freedoms of others are primarily those that 
protect against interference with the forum internum, namely 
coercion in religious choice. Otto-Preminger raised the possibility of 
 
Coercion in the present context does not refer to conversion by coercion, for people 
who truly believe do not change their beliefs as a result of coercion; what we are 
really contemplating is coercion in order to make somebody join a denomination 
and its counterpart, coercion to prevent somebody from leaving a denomination. 
Id. ¶ 17 (Martens, J., partly dissenting). 
 83. Kokkinakis, 260 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) ¶ 48. 
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interference with others’ right to manifestation, but it is difficult to 
imagine how proselytism could have this effect. Both cases use the 
principle of “respect” to denote protection generally against the 
impairment of clearly established rights and freedoms. That concept 
of “respect” is therefore limited by the content of those freedoms, 
and there does not appear to be any recognition of a right to respect 
for one’s religious feelings or beliefs as such. 
3. The importance of particular means of expression and particular 
contexts 
Restrictions on certain forms of religious expression have been 
upheld by the European Court owing to the sensitivities of particular 
media (particularly broadcast media) or particular contexts (such as 
the armed services or state education). These restrictions deserve 
special comment because they inevitably influence the outcome of 
individual decisions. 
 a. Medium of expression. The importance of the medium through 
which a religious message is communicated is illustrated by the case 
of Murphy v. Ireland84 in which the Court upheld, under Article 10, 
a blanket prohibition on religious advertising through broadcast 
media. The Court’s decision turned primarily on the applicant’s 
“means of expression” and not the message itself, the central issue 
being whether a prohibition of a certain type (advertising) of 
expression (religious) through a particular means (the broadcast 
media) could justifiably be prohibited in the particular circumstances 
of the case.85  
 b. Armed services. As to particular contexts, the only case in 
which the European Court has found that restrictions on proselytism 
did not violate Article 9 was Larissis v. Greece.86 Larissis concerned 
evangelism by Pentecostal air force officers directed towards 
subordinate airmen. In upholding the restrictions, the Court did not 
follow the Commission’s ground of justification, namely that of 
“ensuring that the three airmen’s religious beliefs were respected,”87 
but did support the legitimate aim of “protecting the rights and 
 
 84. Murphy v. Ireland, App. No. 44179/98, 38 Eur. H.R. Rep. 212 (2002). 
 85. Id. ¶ 72. 
 86. Larissis v. Greece, 65 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1998). 
 87. Id. ¶ 44. 
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freedoms of others.”
 88 The Court considered the “particular 
characteristics of military life and its effects on the situation of 
individual members of the armed forces” to be decisive.89 By the 
same token, in relation to restrictions on the proselytizing of 
civilians, which did result in a finding of violation of Article 9, it was 
crucial that the civilians were not subject to pressures and constraints 
of the same kind as airmen.90 The difference was expressed as: 
“[W]hat would in the civilian world be seen as an innocuous 
exchange of ideas which the recipient is free to accept or reject, may, 
within the confines of military life, be viewed as a form of harassment 
or the application of undue pressure in abuse of power.”91 
Prominent in the “rights and freedoms of others” in these 
particular circumstances appears to be freedom from coercion in 
religious choice, given that the Court observed that airmen must not 
only have felt constrained, perhaps obliged, to enter into religious 
discussions with the applicants, but also possibly “even to convert to 
the Pentacostal faith.”92  
 c. Parental rights. A quite different and more explicit concept 
of “respect” for religious convictions is found in the context of the 
protection enjoyed by parents in relation to the state education of 
their children. Parents are entitled to ensure that their own religious 
and philosophical convictions are respected in their children’s 
education by virtue of Article 18(4) of the International Covenant, 
and Protocol 1, Article 2 of the European Convention.93 Issues arise 
principally in relation to the content of teaching on religious or 
philosophical matters within the school curriculum and, to a lesser 
extent, compulsion in administering school discipline.94 However, it 
 
 88. Id. ¶ 49. 
 89. Id. ¶ 50. 
 90. Id. ¶ 59. 
 91. Id. ¶ 51. 
 92. Id. ¶ 53. 
 93. For the origins and drafting of Protocol 1, Article 2, see J.E.S. FAWCETT, THE 
APPLICATION OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 411–16 (1987). See also 
1981 Declaration, supra note 5, art. 5(2); Conference on Sec. & Cooperation in Eur. [CSCE], 
Concluding Document of the Vienna Meeting of the Representatives of the Participating States, ¶ 
16(k) (Jan. 17, 1989). 
 94. See Desmond M. Clarke, Freedom of Thought in Schools: A Comparative Study, 35 
INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 271 (1986). Clarke provides a review of the secular/neutral models for 
religious education in the U.S. and France, compared with that in Ireland (where there is no 
network of secular schools). Id. He places particular emphasis on the role of State funding and 
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should not be forgotten that the true context for evaluating the 
scope of Protocol 1, Article 2 is its underlying aim to prevent 
indoctrination by, at worst, totalitarian governments, with due 
regard for the requirements of pluralism. As the European Court 
stressed in the Danish Sex Education Case,95 the second sentence of 
Protocol 1, Article 2 “aims in short at safeguarding the possibility of 
pluralism in education which possibility is essential for the 
preservation of the ‘democratic society’ as conceived by the 
Convention. In view of the power of the modern State, it is above all 
through State teaching that this aim must be realised.”96 
One inevitable consequence of pluralism is the visible evidence of 
different religions throughout society. However, the Court’s 
rationale in Dahlab v. Switzerland97 for supporting the prohibition 
on a teacher wearing an Islamic headscarf in a state school—on the 
limitation grounds of the rights and freedoms of others as well as 
public order and public safety—sadly illustrates that the stigma 
attached to proselytism is such that it may easily be invoked to 
support restrictions on any form of religious expression in the 
context of state education. The potential harm of wearing a 
headscarf was described by the Court in the following, quite 
extraordinary, terms: 
The Court accepts that it is very difficult to assess the impact that a 
powerful external symbol such as the wearing of a headscarf may 
have on the freedom of conscience and religion of very young 
children. The applicant’s pupils were aged between four and eight, 
an age at which children wonder about many things and are also 
more easily influenced than older pupils. In those circumstances, it 
cannot be denied outright that the wearing of a headscarf might 
have some kind of proselytising effect, seeing that it appears to be 
imposed on women by a precept which is laid down in the Koran 
and which, as the Federal Court noted, is hard to square with the 
principle of gender equality. It therefore appears difficult to 
reconcile the wearing of an Islamic headscarf with the message of 
 
risks of indoctrination. Id. For a discussion about the return of religious teaching in the 
educational system of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to rectify the historical exclusion 
from the educational system of any religious teaching, see Boris Milosaviljevic, Relations 
Between the State and Religious Communities in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 2002 BYU 
L. REV. 311. 
 95. Kjeldsen v. Denmark, 23 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1976). 
 96. Id. ¶ 50. 
 97. App. No. 42393/98, 2001-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 1 (2001). 
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tolerance, respect for others and, above all, equality and non-
discrimination that all teachers in a democratic society must convey 
to their pupils.98 
This serves to illustrate the risks of exaggeration of the possible 
effects of proselytism in the context of State education. 
The particular means of expression chosen for proselytism, or the 
particular context in which it occurs, may therefore justify greater 
restriction than in other circumstances, but care must be taken not 
to apply principles developed, for example, to support the need for 
order and discipline in the armed services or to ensure respect for 
parental convictions in education, to proselytism outside those 
circumstances. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Proselytism is a subject that undoubtedly raises considerable 
concern, both to those who regard it as a fundamental freedom 
deserving of the widest protection and to those motivated by fears 
that it might constitute coercion affecting religious choice. It 
warrants careful assessment. The question is precisely how these 
concerns should be reflected in the development of those freedoms 
associated with religious expression, in particular in the use of 
limitation provisions. 
While in principle the right to “teach” and the right to propagate 
one’s beliefs are recognized freedoms within Article 9 of the 
European Convention, uncertainty as to the true meaning of 
“proselytism” (given its negative connotations) led to an unworkable 
distinction in the Kokkinakis case between those recognized rights 
and “improper proselytism.”99 The distinction was not clarified in 
the subsequent Larissis case, but there is no doubt about the Court’s 
notional support for the right to teach and to propagate one’s 
beliefs.100 However, the Court has, in recent years, introduced the 
concept of “respect” to support restrictions on certain forms of 
expression. To the extent that the limitation ground of “the rights 
and freedoms of others” is relevant to proselytism consisting of the 
persuasive portrayal of beliefs under Article 9, it was argued that it is 
primarily applicable to fundamental interference with the forum 
 
 98. Id. at 13. 
 99. Kokkinakis v. Greece, 260 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) ¶ 48 (1993). 
 100. Larissis v. Greece, 65 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1998). 
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internum, namely freedom from coercion in religious choice. This 
would produce consistency with Article 18(2) of the International 
Covenant. That ground of limitation would also be appropriate 
where the effect of a particular form of expression under Article 10 is 
so extreme as to inhibit the enjoyment of any recognized rights. 
However, the limitation provisions applicable generally to freedom 
of expression are of concern unless suitably contained. In the 
Wingrove case, the European Court corrected the inappropriate 
application to Article 9 of principles separately developed under 
Article 10,101 when previous case law such as Otto-Preminger equated 
“respect for the religious feelings of believers” with the guarantees in 
Article 9.102 
It is likely that the European Court will in the near future face a 
new range of claims based upon measures prohibiting disparagement 
or vilification of religious groups or their belief systems.103 It is in this 
context that tolerance plays such an important role but not so as to 
restrict freedom of expression unduly. The balance is encapsulated in 
the familiar principle that freedom of expression applies “not only to 
‘information’ or ‘ideas’ that are favorably received or regarded as 
inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, but also to those that 
offend, shock, or disturb; such are the demands of pluralism, 
tolerance, and broadmindedness without which there is no 
‘democratic society.’”104 
Looking back over the historical treatment of proselytism, the 
link between extreme forms of proselytism and coercion to change 
religion appears to have been made principally in the early U.N. 
debates and in the European Court’s concept of “improper” 
proselytism. However, when evaluating current U.N. standards, as 
reflected by the Human Rights Committee and in the work of the 
Special Rapporteur, there does not appear to be any discernable 
correlation between proselytism and coercion. This paper submits 
 
 101. Wingrove v. United Kingdom, 24 Eur. H.R. Rep. (1996). 
 102. Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria, 295 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) ¶ 47 (1994). 
 103. For a critique of Australia’s anti-vilification laws, see Patrick Parkinson, Law 
Professor, Univ. of Sydney, Australia, Enforcing Tolerance: Vilification Laws and Religious 
Freedom in Australia, Paper Given at the Eleventh Annual International Law and Religion 
Symposium: Religion in the Public Sphere: Challenges and Opportunities, (Oct. 5, 2004), 
http://www.iclrs.org/symposium/2004/ParkinsonPaper2004.doc. 
 104. Handyside v. United Kingdom, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) ¶ 18 (1976); see also 
Murphy v. Ireland, App. No. 44179/98, 38 Eur. H.R. Rep. 212 (2002). 
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that it is time to reassess and redefine proselytism by reference to its 
true nature. At the same time, proper constraints should be observed 




 105. This paper has drawn on material from PAUL M. TAYLOR, FREEDOM OF RELIGION: 
UN AND EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS LAW AND PRACTICE (2005), reproduced with 
permission from Cambridge University Press. 
